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On 23 June 2016 the voters in the United Kingdom (UK) 
decided by 52% to 48% that the UK should leave the 
European Union (EU). A ‘Brexit’ raises the question of 
how the UK, or possibly some parts of it, can organise 
future relations with the EU. The referendum has revived 
the debate on differentiated integration in Europe – a 
debate that in the past was particularly lively during the 
era of ‘Eurosclerosis’ in the 1970s and in the pre-
enlargement period of the 1990s. This debate has been 
enriched by an external dimension: over the past two 
decades, the EU’s neighbours have developed various 
forms of participation in the internal market. As a result, 
references are made in the ‘Brexit’ debate to the ‘Swiss 
approach’, the ‘Norwegian model’, the ‘Liechtenstein 
solution’ for the free movement of persons, or simply a 
comprehensive free trade agreement. This Policy Brief 
discusses these models and clarifies the main 
implications of such external differentiated integration 
to draw some lessons for ‘Brexit’.  
 
Differentiated integration within the EU 
 
The EU’s dogma of ‘an ever closer union’ implies a uniform 
process of deepening integration among all member 
states. Any flexibility in this integration process has mainly 
played a role in the form of transitional periods in case of 
limited capacities of acceding countries and of ‘opt-outs’ 
on the occasion of treaty revisions in the absence of 
political will for closer integration. The debate on 
differentiated integration has generated many concepts, 
ranging from ‘multi-speed Europe’ and ‘variable geometry’ 
to ‘concentric circles’ or a ‘core Europe’. The 1992 
Maastricht Treaty had in fact authorised selective 
integration among EU member states by granting ‘opt-
outs’ to the governments of the UK and Denmark and by 
establishing an economic and monetary union at different 
speeds. In 1997 the Treaty of Amsterdam institutionalised 
the possibility of ‘enhanced cooperation’ − further 
facilitated by the 2001 Treaty of Nice. Enhanced 
cooperation allows a group of member states to advance 
integration among themselves within EU structures 
(whereas the Schengen Area was still initiated outside the 
EU treaties and institutions).  
 
External differentiated integration 
 
In contrast to internal differentiation, external differentia-
tion refers to different forms of integration that non-
members have with the EU and in particular its core 
project: the internal market with its free movement of 
goods, services, capital and persons. Third countries with 
Executive Summary 
> The ‘Brexit’ debate has triggered new interest in 
the European Union’s close economic relations 
with its neighbours. 
> This external ‘differentiated integration’ 
flourished since the 1990s, ranging from narrow, 
bilateral and static models to broad, multilateral 
and dynamic models. 
> Major lessons can be drawn from these models for 
the UK’s ‘differentiated disintegration’: 
1. deep economic integration involves domestic 
regulatory issues and tends to be based on the 
acquis;  
2. cherry-picking, such as excluding the free 
movement of persons from a comprehensive 
access to the internal market, is not on offer; and  
3. even the European Free Trade Area members 
of the highly institutionalised European 
Economic Area have very limited access to EU 
decision-making.  
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‘a stake’ in the internal market subscribe to deep 
economic integration. Deep integration − as opposed to 
‘shallow’ integration which focuses on the removal of 
barriers at the border – involves ‘behind-the-border’ 
integration with regulatory cooperation and common 
standards and rules in areas such as competition policy, 
intellectual property or investment. In the EU’s external 
relations, deep economic integration normally implies 
legal approximation to and/or adoption of parts of the 
acquis. In other words, external differentiation entails 
outsiders, especially neighbouring countries, adopting EU 
rules to differing degrees. This leads to a system of EU 
‘external governance’ where parts of the acquis are 
extended to non-member states without an equivalent 
parallel inclusion in EU policy-making. 
 
This section discusses the main models of such external 
differentiated integration: the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area (EEA), the EU’s bilateral 
approach with Switzerland, the customs union agree-
ments with Turkey, Andorra and San Marino, and the 
evolving European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). They 
appear to fit the concept of ‘variable geometry’ best. Out 
of these, the most far-reaching affiliation with the internal 
market, the EEA, has become an important reference 
point in the debate: for the Swiss Confederation which, 
according to Article 128 EEA Agreement, may at any time 
apply to become a contracting party, for the ENP countries 
as a long-term source of inspiration, for the small-sized 
European countries but also for Turkey and, most recently, 
the UK. To join the EEA as a non-EU member, a country 
would currently have to accede to the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) first. 
 
The multilateral EEA: a blueprint? 
 
The EEA extends since 1994 the internal market’s four 
freedoms as well as horizontal and flanking policies to the 
members of EFTA, except for Switzerland. Excluded are the 
common agricultural and fisheries policies, budget 
contributions, regional policy, taxation, economic and 
monetary policy as well as the EU’s external relations. All 
EFTA countries have concluded additional bilateral agree-
ments with the EU, for instance governing participation in 
the Schengen Area. 
 
The EEA’s institutional set-up is a complex, ‘quasi-
supranational’ system of two ‘pillars’, the EU and EFTA. For 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, the multilateral EEA is 
a dynamic acquis-based form of integration which leads to 
the incorporation of on average more than 300 new EU 
acts per year. The main discussion of new law takes place 
within the EEA Joint Committee in the so-called ‘decision-
shaping phase’ after the Commission has transmitted its 
proposals to the Council and the European Parliament as 
well as to the three EEA EFTA states. The EEA Joint 
Committee decides by consensus as soon as possible after 
the EU’s adoption of new acquis. In the EFTA countries, 
enforcement is carried out by the independent EFTA 
Surveillance Authority in Brussels and the EFTA Court in 
Luxembourg. If the EFTA countries, which need to ‘speak 
with one voice’, wish to ‘opt out’ from new rules, the EU 
could suspend the related parts of the EEA Agreement. 
This has not happened so far. Overall, the EEA attempts to 
reconcile the principles of internal market homogeneity 
and EU decision-making autonomy, with the result that 
EFTA lacks a real right of co-decision.  
 
Regarding the free movement of persons, Liechtenstein is 
clearly a special case for which a ‘special solution’ was 
found. In addition to a transitional period and a review 
clause, it obtained a joint declaration with the EEA Council. 
This declaration recognised Liechtenstein as a very small 
area of rural character with an unusually high percentage 
of non-national residents and employees. It also 
acknowledged the principality’s vital interest in maintain-
ing its own national identity. Although the free movement 
of persons applies to Liechtenstein, EEA citizens wishing to 
live in the country have to obtain a residence permit. The 
number of permits is limited, with a yearly net increase, 
and half of them are granted by a ballot procedure. There 
are no restrictions preventing family members of holders 
of a residence permit from joining them. The arrangement 
is reviewed every five years.  
 
Despite significant treaty reform in the EU during the past 
two decades, the EEA Agreement itself has – unlike its 
annexes listing the relevant acquis – remained largely 
unchanged. There have been controversies in particular 
about the selection of new EU acts as ‘EEA-relevant’ 
internal market legislation. Moreover, the EU increasingly 
adopts packages instead of individual acts. This creeping 
extension of the scope of the EEA Agreement is not 
matched with the participation of the EEA EFTA states in 
the relevant decision-shaping processes, for instance in 
new bodies and forms of governance. The EEA EFTA states 
are not represented in either the Council or the European 
Parliament, which has gained more powers. As a result, 
the absorption of new EU rules increasingly requires 
adaptations to the legal acts, which leads to delays in the 
implementation and risks weakening the homogeneity of 
EEA law. A comprehensive review of the EEA in 2010-13 
did not, however, lead to any significant reforms, not least 
for fear of opening ‘Pandora’s box’. 
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EU-Switzerland bilateralism: at its limits? 
 
EFTA member Switzerland opted through a referendum in 
1992 not to participate in the EEA. Instead, the country 
pursued a bilateral approach vis-à-vis the EU, building on 
its 1972 free trade agreement with the European 
Communities. In two package deals in 1999 and 2004 it 
concluded 16 new sectoral agreements with the EU (free 
movement of persons, technical barriers to trade, public 
procurement, civil aviation, overland transport, agricul-
ture, research, Schengen and Dublin association, taxation 
of savings, fight against fraud, processed agricultural 
products, environment, statistics, media, education, and 
pensions). A few more agreements have followed since 
and some are still under negotiation.  
 
Most of these ‘bilaterals’ are based on the notion of 
equivalence of laws between the EU and Switzerland and 
any changes need to be negotiated, albeit with two 
exceptions where Switzerland accepts the EU acquis: in 
civil aviation − where the Commission and the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU) have competences in surveillance 
and arbitration in specified areas; and with regard to 
Schengen and the Dublin Convention where Swiss 
adoption of any new acts requires approval from the Swiss 
legislature (and Swiss representatives participate without 
a vote in the relevant EU committees and working groups). 
In these two cases, if new acts are not adopted, the 
relevant bilateral agreement could be terminated. This 
sectoral approach lacks an overarching structure to deal 
with the ca. 20 main agreements, most of which are run by 
a consensus-based Joint Committee of officials from both 
sides, and the more than 100 secondary agreements.  
 
The EU has in recent years insisted on the limits of such a 
static approach and on finding a more efficient institutional 
solution for taking over relevant new EU acts and case law 
and for ensuring the surveillance and enforcement of 
existing agreements. In 2012, the Swiss Federal Council 
submitted some institutional proposals to the EU, 
accepting the overall objective of homogeneity and the 
incorporation of future changes to the acquis, provided 
that this was not automatic and that Switzerland could in 
turn participate in the decision-shaping process. However, 
the EU did not approve a two-pillar model, whereby each 
party would retain responsibility for ensuring the 
application and interpretation of the common rules on its 
territory (that is, Swiss national market surveillance). In 
2013, it was agreed as a negotiation basis that the CJEU 
should interpret the EU acquis adopted by Switzerland to 
strengthen legal certainty. Yet, in February 2014 the talks 
have been stalled as a result of the Swiss acceptance (by a 
slim margin of 50.3%) of a popular initiative requiring the 
introduction of immigration quotas. This constitutional 
amendment, which the Swiss government has to 
implement within three years, is not compatible with the 
agreement on the free movement of persons. The non-
extension of the latter to Croatia after its accession to the 
EU in 2013 triggered Switzerland’s (partial) loss of access to 
the EU’s research and education, ‘Horizon 2020’ and 
‘Erasmus+’, programmes. The Commission rejected the 
suggestion of a unilateral safeguard clause with a national 
ceiling on EU migration to Switzerland. If no solution is 
found, the so-called ‘guillotine clause’ in the 1999 package 
risks terminating the entire series of bilateral treaties. The 
‘Brexit’ vote has certainly not facilitated a compromise for 
the Swiss problem in light of the UK’s intention to curtail 
migration from the EU as well. 
 
EU-Turkey customs union: stepping stone or dead end? 
 
Turkey has been associated with the EU since 1963 and in 
2005 commenced accession negotiations. Turkey’s 
customs union with the EU, established in 1996 as a step 
towards membership, allows all industrial goods and 
processed agricultural products that comply with EU norms 
to be traded freely in the EU. For this purpose, Turkey 
adopted the EU’s common external tariff and the acquis in 
the area of technical barriers to trade. Turkey also aligns its 
legislation in other essential internal market areas, notably 
competition policy and protection of intellectual property 
rights. Moreover, in order to ensure the proper functioning 
of the customs union, Turkey is expected to interpret 
provisions which are identical in substance to the 
corresponding EU treaty provisions in conformity with the 
relevant EU case law. An EU-Turkey Association Council, 
composed of ministerial-level representatives from both 
sides, tries to find a solution to any conflict and may 
unanimously decide to submit a dispute to the CJEU, 
another court or an arbitration tribunal. The Commission 
informally consults Turkish experts when drafting relevant 
new acquis, and further consultations may take place in the 
Joint Committee. Yet these input opportunities are less 
developed compared to those offered in the EEA. 
 
The customs union constitutes a narrow, bilateral and only 
partially dynamic model. It binds Turkey to the EU’s 
common commercial policy without offering it proper 
means of influence. Also, the EU’s trade agreements have 
opened up third markets for EU exports but not for Turkish 
exports − despite granting the partners access to the 
Turkish market. The 1963 Association Agreement had 
envisaged agriculture being included in the customs union 
but this was not pursued. Moreover, the provisions in the 
Additional Protocol of 1970 on the free movement of 
workers, services and capital were not implemented. 
Nevertheless, the customs union has contributed to the 
considerable economic growth of the Turkish economy.  
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Very small states: from absorption to association 
 
The three small-sized European countries of Andorra, San 
Marino and Monaco are – unlike the Holy See and 
Liechtenstein – also part of the EU’s customs territory. 
Their relations with the EU have developed from indirect 
integration based on their historical relations with 
neighbouring EU member states to direct agreements with 
the EU. Whereas Andorra and San Marino have concluded 
bilateral cooperation and customs union agreements with 
the EU, Monaco still relies on its close relationship with 
France. The three countries have no participatory rights in 
the EU’s decision-making processes, but have to 
implement the relevant acquis. They have also concluded 
bilateral monetary agreements with the EU, which allow 
them to use the Euro and grant competence to the CJEU.  
 
All three countries have in recent years expressed a wish 
to enhance their relations with the EU since they still face 
obstacles in accessing the internal market. In a declaration 
on Article 8 TEU, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU 
promises to ‘take into account the particular situation of 
small-sized countries which maintain specific relations of 
proximity with it’. Several options ranging from joining the 
EEA or bilateral sectoral agreements to EU membership 
have been discussed. In March 2015, the EU opened 
negotiations on a multilateral (or several bilateral) 
framework association agreement(s) with the three states. 
The negotiations envisage special governance and 
consultation arrangements as well as an independent 
monitoring and enforcement of the acquis, possibly by the 
EU institutions.  
 
In Article 8 TEU the Treaty calls on the Union to ‘develop a 
special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to 
establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, 
founded on the values of the Union and characterised by 
close and peaceful relations based on cooperation’. This 
includes the conclusion of agreements containing 
reciprocal rights and obligations as well as periodic 
consultation on their implementation. The Article targets 
mainly the EU’s post-enlargement neighbours to the east 
and south but a ‘future neighbour’ like the UK might also 
be interested in the association agreement that this 
provision is hinting at. 
 
European Neighbourhood Policy: from soft to hard law 
 
The ENP’s legal bases are the bilateral Euro-Mediter-
ranean Association Agreements and the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements with the transition countries to 
the East. The agreements encourage the approximation of 
legislation to the acquis; tailor-made bilateral Action Plans 
define jointly agreed reform priorities; and the EU 
supports the implementation process with technical and 
financial assistance. In a further step, (new) Association 
Agreements are complemented by Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). The DCFTAs 
cover substantially all trade in goods and services as well 
as ‘behind-the-border’ issues such as standards, 
competition policy or intellectual property rights. They 
require the partners’ capacity to approximate and take on 
elements of the EU acquis. In particular, the countries 
commit to the relevant acquis regarding technical barriers 
to trade and certain services. 
 
Not all the countries are up to such far-reaching 
integration with the EU, and some of them are plagued by 
conflicts. The 2014 Association Agreements with Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia contain different legislative 
approximation mechanisms with varying degrees of 
obligation and various procedures to amend the 
incorporated rules. The Commission has to notify these 
ENP countries of relevant changes. The Association 
Council or Association Committee may modify the annexes 
to take into account the evolution of EU law, and in some 
sectors of the DCFTA a dynamic procedure to update the 
acquis is foreseen. Dispute settlement arrangements vary 
across sectors from consultation, arbitration or mediation 
to rulings by the CJEU. The DCFTAs per se do not, unlike 
the EEA, aim at the creation of a homogenous and dynamic 
legal space but are instead based on market access 
conditionality, which links additional access to the internal 
market to progress in implementation. They thus entail a 
shift from narrow, static soft law to a broader and binding 
hard law approach.  
 
Lessons for ‘Brexit’ from differentiated integration  
 
Several lessons can be drawn from this overview of the 
EU’s evolving relations with neighbouring countries for 
what could be understood as a form of ‘differentiated 
disintegration’ of the UK.  
 
First, internal differentiation – as the UK had at times 
practiced in the past – presupposes EU membership with 
a seat at the table and voting rights. 
 
Second, when it comes to external differentiation, the EU 
generally does not grant any à la carte integration with its 
internal market in terms of picking and choosing. Indeed, 
rich countries such as the EFTA states, for instance, 
actually contribute to cohesion in the EU through special 
financial cooperation mechanisms. Moreover, the EU has 
– in return for internal market access – sought agreements 
in areas of its own interest such as taxation. This also 
means that a comprehensive participation in the internal 
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market without free movement of persons is hard to 
imagine. This has been confirmed by the Swiss case. The 
special solution applying to Liechtenstein is closely linked 
to its tiny territory (160 km2) and high number of 
foreigners (representing about one third of the resident 
population and two thirds of the workforce). No EU or EEA 
EFTA state has contested Liechtenstein’s limited 
absorption capacity.  
 
Third, a customs union agreement based on the Turkish 
model is not an attractive long-term option for a country 
like the UK as it inter alia requires abandoning the capacity 
to determine one’s own trade policy while aligning to 
relevant EU acquis.  
 
Fourth, although often referred to as a blueprint, the EEA 
− the most far-reaching internal market association based 
on a free trade area − can only to a limited extent serve as 
a model for the UK. Unlike the other neighbours, the EFTA 
countries are eligible for EU membership but have so far 
chosen not to join. They are highly developed, small and 
‘like-minded’ economies that have to ‘speak with one 
voice’ in EEA bodies, which is why they are not very keen 
on expanding EFTA’s membership − although the UK was 
a founding member of EFTA in 1960. Compared to the UK’s 
votes and seats in the EU institutions today, the EEA offers 
very little participation in EU decision-making yet entails 
similarly extensive internal market obligations.  
 
Fifth, any close economic association with the EU requires 
an effective mechanism through which third countries 
keep up with the evolution of the acquis in order to 
safeguard market homogeneity. There is an inherent 
trade-off between the benefits resulting from the internal 
market and the lack of participation in the law-making 
process, which leaves little room for parliamentary 
control. Size can matter in this regard since what is 
acceptable to a small state in terms of a curtailment of its 
sovereignty might not be tolerable for a bigger state.  
 
Finally, new models of external differentiation beyond the 
scope of this overview could be imagined. However, some 
crucial principles of EU law (such as non-discrimination) 
and politics (such as the setting of precedents, the 
preservation of the EU’s decision-making autonomy or the 
maintenance of a balance of benefits and obligations) 
provide the boundaries to what seems feasible for the EU 
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